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Based on 40 life-story testimonies with 
young Cairene activists, this article argues 
that post-revolutionary Egypt was marked 
by Continuous Traumatic Stress (CTS). 
CTS is a phenomenological term that 
accounts for the structurally traumatic 
nature of political repression. It empha-
sizes the continuing temporality of such 
pervasive traumatizaton and the struc-
tural political stressors that underpin it. 
CTS thus entails a specifically political 
conception of trauma, according to which 
traumatic stress is in fact constituted by a 
violent, corrupt, unaccountable political 
and judicial system. This article argues 
that the traumatic experiences of activists 
in pre-and post-revolutionary Egypt are 
best perceived through the lens of CTS.  It 
also insists that such traumatic stress—par-
ticularly the lack of justice and formal 
recourse—provided a fertile breeding 
ground for revenge and social polariza-
tion, which was directly incited by coun-
ter-revolutionary actors (such as the mili-
tary and Muslim Brotherhood leadership), 
thereby sadly further contributing to the 
(seemingly endless) continuous cycle of 
continued traumatic stress. 
Keywords: Egypt, Trauma, Polarization, 
Injustice, Revenge
Introduction
This research draws on 40 life-story testi-
monies of young (18-35 years) Cairene 
activists (25 male, 15 female) from different 
political orientations (liberal, socialist, 
Muslim Brotherhood, and Salafist), con-
ducted between October 2013 and 
February 2014.  The experiences of these 
activists are marked by Continuous 
Traumatic Stress (CTS), which is a phenom-
enological therapeutic term developed by 
anti-apartheid South African psycholo-
gists to accounts for the relentless trau-
matic nature of political repression and its 
ensuing social conflict (Straker and 
Moosa). The key markers of CTS are the 
emphasis on a different—continuing—tem-
porality of traumatizaton and the empha-
sis on the structural political stressors that 
cause this traumatization (Straker; Straker 
and Moosa). CTS hence advances a spe-
cifically political conception of traumatic 
stress that is constituted by a violent, cor-
rupted political and judicial system (Eagle 
and Kaminer; Straker). In contexts of CTS, 
traumatic injustices are systemic and per-
vasive: the political authorities that were 
supposed to protect the people are the 
direct perpetrators or at best colluding in 
the abuses. Hence, in CTS, there is no 
recourse to the judicial or reconciliation 
processes. Rather, “the law is part of the 
problem rather than potentially part of the 
FOCUS 89
Injustice Turned Inward? 
Continuous Traumatic Stress and 
Social Polarization in Egypt
Vivienne Matthies-Boon
Middle East – Topics & Arguments #11–2018
FOCUS 90
solution” (Straker and Moosa 458). CTS is 
particularly useful since it sheds light on 
the feelings of disorientation and numb-
ing pervasiveness of fear due to the con-
tinuation and pervasiveness of traumatic 
threats from which there is no respite. It 
also notes the difficulty of differentiating 
between real and perceived or imagined 
threats within such situations (Eagle and 
Kaminer), and how in those circumstances 
there are often two divergent and overlap-
ping coping mechanisms: namely with-
drawal, isolation, and disinterest in (pub-
lic) living, and feelings of increased anger, 
aggression, and even hatred of others 
(Eagle and Kaminer).
In post-revolutionary Egypt, we see a 
destructive cycle of continuous traumatic 
stress. As the state authorities violently 
repressed dissent and foreclosed the pos-
sibilities of justice and political reform, 
activists not only became disillusioned 
with politics (and withdrew from the public 
sphere into social isolation) (Matthies-
Boon; Matthies-Boon and Head), but 
anger and frustration also turned inward 
on society. That is, society became increas-
ingly polarized, and social aggression 
spread like wildfire, thereby sadly further 
contributing to the cycle of continued 
traumatic stress and its feelings of disori-
entation.  
Below, I will first explore the concept of 
CTS, its usefulness, and its contribution to 
trauma theory. I will then provide a brief 
overview of the traumatic stresses—and 
particularly feelings of injustice—activists 
experienced after the 2011 revolution. We 
will see how social polarization increased, 
and how it sets in motion a cycle of 
revenge and emotional outlet that in fact 
unfortunately further aggravated people’s 
experiences of CTS.1 
Continuous Traumatic Stress: What’s in a 
Term?
The concept CTS was developed by psy-
chologists in apartheid South Africa and 
provides a phenomenological account of 
the unpredictable, relentless, and perva-
sive traumatic stresses during political 
repression and civil conflict (Straker and 
Moosa). CTS arose as a therapeutic con-
cept to supplement existing understand-
ings of trauma, such as PTSD (Nuttman-
Shwartz and Shoval-Zuckerman; Stevens 
et al.). Yet, it argued against the individual-
ist, intra-psychical tendencies within much 
of the mainstream trauma literature and 
placed emphasis on the social and politi-
cal contexts—i.e. the traumatic stressors—
that cause the existential experiences of 
hopelessness, alienation, disorientation, 
and disassociation (Straker). The four char-
acteristics of CTS are an emphasis on “the 
context of stressor conditions, the tempo-
ral location of the stressor conditions, the 
complexity of discriminating between real 
and perceived or imagined threat, and the 
absence of external protective systems” 
(Eagle and Kaminer 85). CTS hence not 
only highlights the manner in which indi-
vidual, social, and political dimensions of 
trauma are intertwined during state vio-
lence and repression, but also that in such 
contexts the traumatic experience is not 
located in the past, but continues to be 
omnipresent. 
Moreover, Eagle and Kaminer argue that 
therapeutic help in such contexts should 
not focus on symptom reduction but 
rather on realistic threat discrimination. In 
situations of pervasive and unpredictable 
political violence, it becomes difficult to 
distinguish real traumatic threats from 
imagined or perceived future ones 
(Straker 216). This may lead to experiences 
of existential anxiety and fear that might in 
other circumstances be diagnosed as 
paranoia (Eagle and Kaminer 92). Yet, CTS 
scholars insist that it is important to realize 
that in cases of CTS, “the denial or mini-
malisation of danger might be more prob-
lematic than exaggeration, even if such 
defences allow for reduction of anxiety” 
(Eagler and Kaminer 93). Such denial or 
minimalization could directly compromise 
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the individual’s safety. Furthermore, CTS 
also highlights how in contexts of political 
repression, one of the essential presump-
tions of trauma therapy—namely therapeu-
tic safety—cannot be guaranteed (Straker). 
Importantly, they also point out that within 
contexts of CTS, the social contract 
between the state and the individual is 
entirely broken, which means there is no 
path of official recourse for addressing the 
traumatic violence inflicted (Eagle and 
Kaminer). This includes structural abuse by 
the security state and its cronies, such as 
physical violence, but also other forms of 
systematic destructions of life, such as life-
threatening poverty in contexts of political 
corruption. 
Hence, one of the main contributions of 
CTS for our purposes here is the recogni-
tion that the authorities charged with the 
protection of people are not only infor-
mally embroiled but are the main perpe-
trators of traumatic violence (i.e. the threat 
to life and bodily integrity). This aggra-
vates the traumatic impact since violations 
are accompanied by “resignation, collu-
sion, nonretribution and licence for further 
violation at a systemic level” (Eagle and 
Kaminer 94). Or rather, “systems designed 
to create a sense of accountability and to 
minimize harm to citizens are ineffectual 
and overstretched, at best, or corrupt and 
collusive with informal systems of power, 
at worst” (Eagle and Kaminer 93). Hence, 
there is no or very little respite from the 
continuous threat of violence, and the cul-
ture of fear and suspicion spreads through 
society. Individuals may experience not 
only a sensation of hyper alertness but 
also a deep sense of vulnerability, a sense 
of impotence or loss of control over one’s 
own life, and an altered sense of reality 
that makes it difficult to comprehend 
experiences. 
CTS may thus instill a sense of nihilistic res-
ignation in some, through disinvestment 
in living and a minimization of exposure 
through avoidance (Eagle and Kaminer 
94).  CTS can lead to withdrawal from pub-
lic life as people become “withdrawn into 
a protective envelope, a place of mute, 
aching loneliness, in which the traumatic 
experience is treated as a solitary burden” 
(Erikson 195). As I highlighted elsewhere 
(Matthies-Boon), due to a lack of positive 
revolutionary outcomes and socially 
embedded coping mechanisms, such a 
withdrawal had deeply depoliticizing 
impacts in Egypt. It resulted in (re)atomiza-
tion: the deliberate isolation of each indi-
vidual “from all his peers through the 
machinations of the regime” (Glasius 348). 
However, this article focuses on the other 
possible reaction to CTS, that of expres-
sions of anger and aggression.  In CTS, 
individuals may “engage with the perver-
sion of the good, and the breakdown of 
systems […] by assuming control them-
selves in violent or threatening ways” 
(Eagle and Kaminer 94).  As Eagle and 
Kaminer explain, the adaptation towards 
structural dehumanization in CTS might 
instill a sense of paranoid defensiveness 
but also the desire for hatred and revenge, 
as well as the clinging to prejudices (Eagle 
and Kaminer 96). Structural continuous 
traumatization, and particularly its lack of 
legal or other recourse, hence provides a 
fertile breeding ground for the spread of 
further aggression and revenge (Eagle 
and Kaminer 94). This happened in post-
revolutionary Egypt, where anger and 
frustration—encouraged by the counter-
revolutionary forces of the military and the 
Brotherhood leadership, and stirred on by 
the polarizing Egyptian media—turned 
inward on society and turned people 
against each other. Social polarization 
spread like a wildfire because of the situa-
tion of CTS wherein so many people 
dwelled. Yet, whilst social polarization is an 
expression of CTS, it also further contrib-
utes to it, thereby closing the counter-rev-
olutionary circle of repression.
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Interlude: Theoretical Similarities and 
Divergences
Before continuing I will first explore how 
CTS differs from and contributes to trauma 
theory, notably complex or social/cultural 
trauma. Like other concepts, CTS holds 
that trauma breaks the symbolic order of 
the world (Kirshner, 1994), how people 
bring meaning into and make sense of the 
world. What happens in trauma is a shat-
tering of one’s dwelling in the world—one’s 
sense of being-in and being-with others in 
the world (Bracken; Stolorow). The world 
and one’s social surroundings appear 
alien as trust in the justice of the world 
breaks down – leaving one hanging in a 
void of nihilistic groundlessness. Trauma 
thus2 exposes the brutality of life, and fre-
quently invokes anxiety and meaningless-
ness that may be expressed through sen-
sations of numbing, avoidance behaviour, 
hyper-arousal and alertness, and difficulty 
sleeping. 
As stated earlier, the concept of CTS dif-
fers from that of PTSD due to its explicit 
focus on the structural political stressors 
of continuing traumatic stress rather than 
the individual’s (intrapsychic) responses to 
a past event. It thus also differs from com-
plex-PTSD in that CTS recognizes the 
recurrence (or sequential layering) of trau-
matic experieces and explicitly locates 
these in its systemic political contexts, 
whereas complex trauma focuses more on 
the sequencing of interpersonal trauma 
(e.g. sexual and childhood abuse) (Eagle 
and Kaminer; Nuttman-Shwartz and 
Shoval-Zuckerman). CTS also diverges 
from the notion of cultural trauma 
(Alexander; Sztompka), which explores 
how particular cultural groups mobilize 
around traumatic experiences—see for 
instance minority rights movements. 
Cultural trauma not only potentially reifies 
social or cultural groups; it also presumes 
that groups are able to mobilize in the 
public arena. Yet, in CTS it is precisely the 
public arena that is at best systematically 
compromised and at worst entirely 
destroyed. Sztompka’s insight that social 
trauma entails a rupture or a breakdown 
in social relations that poses an obstacle 
to creative and collective becoming 
remains relevant for CTS (Sztompka). For, 
in such situations, creative social becom-
ing and collective pursuit of justice are 
indeed severly hampered, and may in fact 
itself aggravate conditions of CTS.
Social Polarization as Continuous 
Traumatic Stress in Post-Revolutionary 
Egypt 
Mubarak’s rule fits the classical image of 
CTS: unbridled and unaccountable secu-
rity state violence and structural poverty 
that left a large section of Egyptians strug-
gling for life. The neoliberalization of the 
economy empowered the corrupt, 
untouchable business-cum-political elite, 
whilst forcing millions into poverty, since 
the so-called trickle-down effect never 
materialized (Joya; Mitchell; Soliman).  As 
this interviewee remarked: 
People are left to rot and survive in the 
informal economic sectors. All Muba-
rak did was to secure his own people, 
and play us out against one another. 
(Interview 38)  
Mubarak used his brutal security state 
apparatus—which reigned with impunity—
to repress any social unrest (Ismail). The 
use of informers was rife as people were 
either willingly or unwillingly co-opted 
into the regime’s security apparatus.3 And 
so, we see the classical expression of CTS, 
namely one of (justified) paranoid anxiety 
and fear that permeate everyday life:
There was a lot of fear, and you cannot 
express yourself because you fear eve-
ryone around you. You know that we 
have a very strong intelligence security 
and you are expecting all the time that 
you speak that this guy or this woman 
is going to inform about you – and stuff 
like this. (Interview 32)
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Yet, even this fear and suspicion can never 
fully repress the potential for new creative 
social becoming. During the 2011 revolu-
tion, people collectively expressed their 
frustration, anger, and depression, and 
directed it towards Mubarak and the secu-
rity state (Matthies-Boon and Head). 
Interviewees recalled how they saw a new 
Egypt: brave people were fighting injus-
tices, and they believed that poverty and 
state abuse would be eradicated. It was a 
time of social utopia and extreme hopeful-
ness. Suddenly previously atomized peo-
ple would talk to each other:
You see the Salafist person sit next to 
the most liberal person. […] You see 
the poor classes with the crème de 
la crème and you see them sitting to-
gether enjoying a civil conversation 
and it was beautiful and so simple. (In-
terview 10)
Though the revolution was of course satu-
rated with counter-revolutionary violence 
from its inception, it was the connection 
between people—and its potential for cre-
ative social becoming—that posed the 
gravest threat to the established political 
order. It drew people out of their atomized 
shells and made them collectively target 
the state’s institutions.  
After Mubarak’s resignation and the 
Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) 
takeover, we see a deliberate attempt to 
break this spirit of collectivity and maintain 
the established political and economic 
order (HRW). SCAF violently dispersed 
protests (shooting, maiming, and killing 
protestors), publically stigmatized protes-
tors (as being prostitutes, spies, and 
thugs), and insisted it was time for security 
and stability (playing on people’s already 
heightened fears for economic survival). 
During SCAF’s rule, we also see the torture 
of street children, virginity trials, and orga-
nized mass sexual assaults against women 
during protests. Female respondents 
explained how these mass assaults made 
them extremely fearful of going to pro-
tests, and when they did they were hyper-
alert. Another tactic used to instill fear into 
protestors was the systematic use of tor-
ture. Torture is an effective tool for political 
repression since it instils a complete exis-
tential helplessness and uncanny loneli-
ness at the hands of the other, and thus 
severs our trust in our shared social world. 
As this young man remarked:
You cannot describe what you lived in 
these moments. You cannot put it in 
words. You live in different world than 
other people. Once you have experi-
enced what I have experienced, you 
have experienced the worst and you 
live with death inside of you every day. 
(Interview 37)
Like him, all respondents who were tor-
tured relayed how it ruptured their social 
relations and left them with a deep sense 
of alienation (from both themselves and 
others). 
These are just some of the examples of 
grave physical force that was used by the 
security forces in 2012 to suppress political 
protest. Overall, the violence experienced 
by all respondents between 2011 and 2014 
has been grave: twenty-six commented 
on the pervasiveness of death in their 
lives, twelve interviewees were tear-
gassed, eleven were directly injured, 
seven were detained (and beaten), four 
were tortured, four were sexually abused, 
and three experienced near-death. 
Furthermore, twelve had friends who died, 
twelve had friends who were injured, nine 
had friends who were detained, and seven 
had friends who were tortured. Also, seven 
had family members who were injured, 
three had family member who were 
detained, two had family members who 
died, two had family members who were 
tortured, and one had a family member 
who nearly died. The threat of violence 
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was hence everywhere, continuous and 
ever pervasive. 
What aggravated the traumatic nature of 
this pervasive violence was its perceived 
injustice. One young man narrated how 
during Mubarak’s years he had not hoped 
for any justice, but the revolution instilled 
a deep ethical commitment in him to fight 
for the rights of those who died. Yet, “when 
we discovered that none of the people 
who killed where punished, we discov-
ered that the worst part of it is the injustice, 
the violence, yeah” (Interview 38). It was 
hence not only that people were killed but 
the lack of political accountability and 
change that angered people. As this per-
son remarked: 
My real sentiment is that I am infuriated 
by injustice. […] basically I don’t want 
people to be unaccountable. My idea 
is that if something happens, the per-
son no matter who he is, gets called on 
it and has to answer for it. […] That’s the 
key thing for me. I am not infuriated —
for example if something happens to 
someone, I’m not very compassionate 
in terms of ‘poor thing’. I’m just infuri-
ated for that person. That’s my notion 
of… not being able to get away with 
something sinister. (Interview 11)
 
This feeling of sinister injustice became 
further imprinted on respondents as they 
saw politicians act in their self-interests 
rather than for the common good. One 
such example is the secret handover deal 
Muslim Brotherhood leadership struck 
with the military in September 2011. This 
deal guaranteed the secrecy of the mili-
tary’s budget whilst ensuring quick elec-
tions that the Brotherhood would no 
doubt win (which it did in December 2011 
and January 2012). Subsequently, the 
Brotherhood leadership called for its 
members not to join the protestors during 
the violent Mohamed Mahmoud clashes 
in November 2011. This left a deep sense 
of betrayal and injustice:
I will never forget and tolerate what 
the Brotherhood did at that moment… 
I can tolerate the police as we expec-
ted this of them but never the Brother-
hood… they did not only remain silent, 
they incited against us… the Brother-
hood wasted a historical chance for this 
country to become a real democratic 
country when they had their deals with 
the SCAF. (Interview 7)
  
When the Mohamed Morsi then became 
President after elections in June 2012, the 
political situation did not improve. Protests 
were frequently and violently dispersed 
by either the security forces or Brotherhood 
vigilante groups after security forces had 
disappeared from the street. Moreover, 
protestors were again castigated as char-
acters with questionable morality: thugs, 
prostitutes, and spies that sought to tar-
nish and bring down the nation. Security 
forces killed, tortured, and detained pro-
testors en masse with impunity. Notable 
here is the Port Said massacre in February 
2012 that killed 74 members of the Al Ahly 
football club supporters (Doward). 
Furthermore, on the formal political stage 
the Brotherhood stigmatized and 
excluded the political opposition. Social 
violence was further encouraged by, for 
instance, driving buses of Brotherhood 
supporters to sites of oppositional pro-
tests. This included the Presidential Palace 
protest in December 2012, where protest-
ers objected to Morsi’s presidential decree 
in November 2012 that granted him immu-
nity against any legal challenge and called 
for a constitutional referendum on an 
overtly Islamist constitutional draft. Whilst 
until this point political violence had been 
directed at the state authorities, now civil-
ians physically fought each other: 
I’m always used to conflict and violence 
from the police, from the army, but 
what I saw around the palace in De-
cember 2012 was traumatic, shocking, 
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so ehm... I mean I... It is very hard to see 
one of your friends, or those who used 
to be your friends... I won’t say that they 
are shooting us or anything like that 
because very few of them were using 
weapons, but almost every one of 
them was throwing stones, being vio-
lent with us... so imagine that anyone of 
them could be your friend, your neigh-
bor, your brother even. And what made 
me more shocked that I... I always used 
to be a pacifist, peaceful... After the Is-
lamists were attacking us, I started atta-
cking back, throwing stones back and I 
was shocked at my reaction afterwards. 
I went back home, wondering how I 
did that. (Interview 1)
These clashes tore Egyptian society apart. 
Friends, colleagues, and relatives now 
openly fought each other as relations 
became polarized along anti- and pro-
Brotherhood lines. Interviewees remarked 
how during the spring of 2013 social ten-
sions increased and heated verbal and 
physical fights became a prominent fea-
ture of the everyday on the street, inside 
homes, or on public transport. They also 
explained how due to frustration with con-
tinued injustice and lies, they became 
increasingly impatient and aggressive 
with their social surroundings: they 
became unable to hear the opinions of 
those politically opposed to them. What 
particularly weighed on them was the lack 
of structural, revolutionary progress, and 
that protestors had been killed precisely 
for the people they were now arguing 
with. The overwhelming absence of justice 
left a bitter taste, which for many triggered 
the desire for revenge. One respondent 
remarked how the violence of revenge 
had become an emotional outlet:
 
Revenge makes you go after your… 
and you forget about the fact that you 
are not making enough money, the fact 
that you don’t have a job, that the fact 
that your health care system is…is … is 
blah. All of that you‘re forgetting about 
that and you‘re focusing on revenging 
yourself from some people. (Interview 
2)
Others also explained how during such 
violence they felt a release, a relief even, 
which was however compromised after 
the event by the realization that they were 
embroiled in a cycle of violence that had 
become difficult to stop. They felt increas-
ingly alienated not just from themselves 
(“how could I have become this person?”) 
but also from their social surroundings as 
basic social trust plummeted. This modus 
of extreme polarized violence further 
intensified when civilian security forces 
withdrew from the street: 
At the social level […] we have a lot of 
fights, and because the police is not 
like playing a role so people started 
actually to… eh... bypass the law and 
get their own right by their own hands, 
so… yeah. (Interview 6) 
Social violence spread like a wildfire 
throughout Egyptian society, with civilians 
or vigilante gangs now even engaging in 
public practices of torture: 
It was a bit of shock, because we were 
used to the policemen doing torture, 
the army doing torture... the politicians 
doing torture like military police also 
for intelligence or whatever but for 
normal people like here in the streets 
torturing people who they think are 
thugs or whatever, different from them, 
dehumanizing people by other people 
is really shocking. (Interview 22)
Social tensions reached their peak on June 
30 when millions demonstrated on the 
streets after the successful tamarrud (rebel-
lion) campaign,4 which called for early 
elections. The military provided Morsi with 
an ultimatum and deposed him on 3 July 
2013. Brotherhood supporters organized 
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the Ennahda and Rabaa sit-ins, which were 
violently dispersed by the Egyptian secu-
rity services in August 2013, resulting in at 
least 817 dead. This massacre left a deep 
ambiguous imprint on all activists. Those 
who were present described scenes of 
horror: one young woman narrated how, 
inside a nearby mosque, the smell of wad-
ing through a thick layer of blood mixed 
with ice water (as the bodies were covered 
with blocks of ice since it was over 40°C ) 
and seeing all these dead, mutilated bod-
ies made her feel sick, as she was trying to 
help relatives find their loved ones. And 
another person recalled how his father, 
cousin, and Quran teacher had been killed 
right in front of him. Even those who were 
not present—and in fact politically opposed 
to the sit-in—expressed their deep concern 
and ambiguity towards the event and its 
political aftermath. They were angry with 
the people—including loved ones—that 
attended the sit-in and expressed deep 
disappointment with their political choice. 
At the same time, however, they were con-
cerned with how this massacre was legiti-
mized through hate speech in the media, 
and how it intensified the bloodthirsty ten-
dencies they saw emerging around them. 
They narrated how since Rabaa, death and 
violence had become even more of a per-
vasive feature in Egyptian public life. They 
were fearful of going outside, even walk-
ing in the streets, due to random physical 
fights, verbal scuffles, and even acid 
attacks. They narrated finding dead bodies 
on the side of the street (and no one car-
ing), dead bodies being thrown out of driv-
ing vans (again without anyone caring), 
and people being beaten to death by 
passersby as hatred and dehumanization 
reached a boiling point. The threat of vio-
lence was pervasive and instilled in many 
the tragic existential realization that life is 
cheap in Egypt. As one person remarked:
It’s not like these people are monsters—
this is how it happens, this is how it 
happens. You’re living in this deep shit 
and you feel like that threatened and 
you feel like, you know—lives are cheap 
in Egypt. And people are aware of that. 
It’s a very brutal thought. Life here is 
superfluous and people here are awa-
re of that. It is a really brutal thought. 
(Interview 19)
They also asserted that this omnipresence 
of intense violence solidified the Egyptian 
political landscape into two oppositional 
camps—the military and the Brotherhood—
which left no alternative space. As one 
young man put it: “the two big elephants 
are fighting, and we are grass that is being 
trampled” (Interview 38). Or, in the almost 
prophetic words of this young person:
First the system of Mubarak will be 
more and more and more stronger, and 
the poor will be poorer more than now. 
The rich will be richer and more than 
now. There will not be any freedom, 
any justice—justice only if you are rich 
and in power, then you will have justi-
ce. If you are poor, no way. And no one 
will feel like a human, just everybody 
will just be looking for food and drink 
for his family. No one will care about 
anything. They will live a bad life more 
than now I think. No one will care about 
anyone. Step by step… this country is 
going to go down. (Interview 12)
Conclusion
This article argued that CTS is a useful con-
cept to make sense of post-revolutionary 
experiences in Egypt. It provides a lens 
through which to comprehend the feel-
ings of disorientation that result out of the 
relentless traumatic stress that is part and 
parcel of a deeply violent and corrupt 
political order. In the case of Egypt, this 
violence also provided fertile breeding 
ground for revenge and social polariza-
tion that was directly incited by counter-
revolutionary actors (the military and 
Muslim Brotherhood leadership). It 
thereby sadly further contributed to the 
continued reproduction of traumatic 
stress. 
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